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Showing posts with label Joan Sallee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Joan Sallee. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

District Does Grande Property the Right Way and It Will Pay Off

Last night at the Davis City Council meeting, the City Council heard from the school district for the first time about the 41-unit proposed development on DJUSD property that the district has been hoping to sell for some time in order to provide some additional facilities money through the California Education Code’s provisions for the sale of public surplus property.

The result of the meeting was a unanimous 5-0 by the council to move the process forward. At the conclusion of the item, a good sized number of the Grande Property neighbors stood up and cheered. It was the end of a long process, but the last year and a half of this process has marked a model for government agency inter-cooperation between the school district and the city and an equally impressive model for government agency-neighborhood cooperation.

It was only just over one year ago, in their November 18, 2007 Op-Ed in the Davis Enterprise, that former DJUSD Board Trustees Marty West and Joan Sallee accused the newer school board with fiscal mismanagement regarding the Grande Property. They wrote:
“When we left the school board in December 2005, the finances of the school district were in good shape. Any financial mismanagement that has occurred has been on the 2006 and 2007 school board's watch. In early 2006, the board majority rescinded the $5.5 million contract we had signed to sell the Grande Avenue site, thus jeopardizing funding for building a student commons at the high school and modernizing Emerson Junior High School.”
The Vanguard has largely debunked that argument with a detailed recount of the Grande issue that was run on March 10, 2008 as the third installment in the Vanguard Investigation into Tahir Ahad and the dealings of the DJUSD Business Office under his leadership.

In 2005, there was no chance that the neighbors would have stood up and cheered. The early process was marred by neighborhood complaints and backdoor deals, the likes of which are still not fully known even after the Vanguard's investigation.

The gist of the arrangement was a shady three way trade in which the district fearing the city to the invoke the Naylor Act and require sale to the city at below market, tried to swap the land with UC Davis property near the Fairfield school and then sell the land to a Bay Area based developer.

From the March 10, 2008 Vanguard:
The arrangement that Superintendent David Murphy and Tahir Ahad had employed by October of 2005 was a land swap that involved a UC Davis property that was the home of Fairfield Elementary School. This piece of property that the university had not wanted was offered to Davis Joint Unified for at least three years prior to this land exchange. The university had been willing to simply give DJUSD the Fairfield School property at no cost.

Instead, the school district would enter into an agreement with BP Equities in which BP Equities would pay the school district $4.5 million in exchange for helping the school district to acquire the 10-acre site west of Davis. In essence, Davis Joint Unified would trade BP Equities the Grande Property in exchange for $4.5 million and the Fairfield School.

Coincidentally, this $4.5 million happened to be the same monetary amount that the district lost out on matching funds from the state when they missed the Montgomery Elementary school deadline. Questions have arisen as to whether the speed, urgency, and also secrecy of this deal had something to do with that lost funding.

The land exchange generated a large amount of controversy in the community. Under pressure for the seemingly sub-market value sale price, the offer was raised on November 22, 2005 to $5.5 million and the deal was locked in.
In the meeting when the board rescinded the original sale, Board member Provenza expressed his concerns for the process:

“I have an ethical concern about going forward because I feel that the process from the beginning was flawed. And it’s not because of anything that Mr. [Brian] Purcell [from BP Equities] did, he was negotiating with Tahir Ahad in good faith, but our process I believe was flawed from the beginning."
While that deal was approved by the previous board featuring Ms. West and Ms. Sallee, the newly elected board featuring Gina Daleiden, Sheila Allen, and Tim Taylor joined fellow board member Jim Provenza in rescinding the deal in early 2006, much to the chagrin of Joan Sallee and Marty West, who nearly two years later were raising the issue again last November.

It is interesting to note a letter from the Grande Neighborhood Association still posted on their site from September 2005:
"We also learned that Tahir [Ahad] and B.J. [Kline] were working under the impression that the neighborhood endorsed development of the Grande site for 48 homes (Alternative B that we discussed during the neighborhood meeting and potluck in June). We told him that was not the case - the neighborhood supported the concept of the other alternative, which had 33 homes, and was generally consistent with R-1-6 zoning (like that on the west side of the Grande site)."
Note the lack of communication between the two parties. Also note the fact that the district and neighborhood ended up splitting the difference in density right down the middle, with the neighborhood making it a point to give the district last night 41 units which the district wanted quite badly.

Since the time of that letter and the eventual board decision to go ahead with the sale, the district has completely changed its approach. They have met extensively with the Grande Neighborhood Association. They have worked out a deal with the district and the city to develop a 41-unit subdivision which reflects the basic density of the surrounding neighborhood.

Several neighbors came up and raised minor concerns with the plan but were thankful to the district for working with them on their concerns. The biggest concern was the safety issue of bikes pouring out onto Grande Avenue.

So the city council moved one of the lots, lot #9 it was called, which sat on the outside of the development. They agreed to turn that lot into a community gardens in order to allow bike traffic to flow there rather than through the more heavily traveled Mercedes Road which would flow into the new subdivision.

By working with the city, the district helped the neighbors to identify a longstanding safety issue. There are still some details that need to be worked out, but the neighbors are comfortable enough with the process and the commitment of both the city and DJUSD to addressing them, that the project has been moved forward and fast tracked.

One of the issues still be resolved is that the school district would like to prioritize affordable units for their own employees. That will have to take place by lottery and the district has agreed to indemnify the city should the issue of discrimination come up.

All of these issues should be addressed by January when this comes up for a second reading to the ordinance.

Many involved describe this as a win-win-win scenario for all involved. The school district has worked extensively with the neighbors to produce an acceptable development proposal. The district and city have worked close together rather than against each other as typified the early part of the process where the district tried to pull a shady deal out of fear that the city would invoke the Naylor Act.

Instead what we will see come forward is a fully entitled property that will hit the market. Even given the economic downturn and collapse of the housing market, there is nothing more rare in Davis than fully entitled property. As such, when the district puts it on the market, the selling price will well-exceed the $5.5 million that the district would have gotten had they gone through with the sale. Even at that time, there were credible offers, and the Vanguard has seen these in writing, from credible local developers for as much as $8 to $9 million. They sold it quickly to avoid public scrutiny.

From this standpoint alone and from the standpoint of working with the neighbors to gain approval, the district has contradicted the complaints of its two former board members.

But in all likelihood, the district will get far more than the $5.5 million. A prospective owner will quickly recognize that they do not have to build immediately, but rather they can buy the property and wait for the right market. The value is that they know this is Davis property and that the land is fully entitled and they only need to go ahead with the development agreement to make a huge profit.

It is a winning solution for all involved and shows the value of transparency and cooperation. This is the model now for how to do business whereas the previous process was the very model for how not to do business.

---David M. Greenwald reporting

Monday, March 10, 2008

Vanguard Investigation Part III: The Grande Property Agreement

The Vanguard continues its multipart series of former DJUSD Deputy Superintendent Tahir Ahad, Total School Solutions, and fiscal mismanagement of the Davis Joint Unified Business Office during Tahir Ahad’s tenure from 1999 to 2006 as CBO of DJUSD.

The first segment of this series which ran on Sunday, February 24, 2008 examined the inherent problems involved in a conflict of interest. The conflict of interest we examined involved a series of disturbing findings of how Mr. Ahad used his position as Chief Budget Officer (CBO) with the Davis Joint Unified School District as a means by which to start up his own private company for his own private gain. In short, he used public resources for private gain, a serious breach in the public trust.

The second portion of the series ran on March 3, 2008 and focused specifically upon the facilities planning and management beginning with the lost state matching funds for Montgomery Elementary, problems with Korematsu and eventually the King High debacle which led to the new school board finding out exactly what had been going on with the district’s facilities construction money. Basically money was shifted from later projects to make up for lost matching funds for Montgomery, lower than expected matching funds for Korematsu, and other cost overruns. Instead of acknowledging the depths of the problems, Mr. Ahad asked the school board in 2005 to pass a COP (Certificate of Participation), a form of debt financing, to pay for King High and some other projects. In 2006, the board learned that they only had half the money they needed to fund King High, and they realized that money had been shuffled, but only after an extensive investigation and the temporary halting of construction activities at King High.

This segment will continue to look at the facilities funding problems and other fiscal management issues. We examine the property exchange deal involving the Grande Property, which was a highly secretive and unusual process that we will argue violated a number of the California Education Code’s provisions for the sale of public surplus property.

Next week, we will also examine the FCMAT report and Consultant Terri Ryland’s findings. Future segments will include the efforts by the school district to rectify the problems that existed under Tahir Ahad and former DJUSD Superintendent David Murphy; some of which have already been discussed in previous issues. We are also following up on several different reports from other school districts about similar problems with Total School Solutions and Tahir Ahad. Last week in the Modesto Bee, a story was written about the Waterford School District. We will be looking further into that situation.

Grande Property

In 1971, the Davis Joint Unified School District purchased the Grande Property, which is located in North Davis, for the use of an elementary school in anticipation that Davis would continue to grow in a northern direction. They paid just under $60,000 at the time for that property; however, nothing was ever built and growth patterns in Davis have not continued north of the city.

With the growth in the real estate market during the past decades and inflation of housing and property values, the property is worth at least 100 times the value it was purchased, if not more.

The district realizing that it would likely not use the property for a future school began in the late 1990s to look into selling or exchanging the property. Those efforts moved into high gear in 2005.

Complicating any sale of school property is the Naylor Act or Education Code Section 17485 which governs the sale of certain land owned by a school district.

According to the City of Davis’ attorney, Harriet Steiner, the Naylor Act applies if the property meets three specific conditions. First the land must be used at least in part for “outdoor recreational purposes and is open space land particularly suited for recreational purposes.” Second, the land must have been used for those purposes for at least eight years. Third, there can be no other publicly owned land in the area of the site that is adequate for meeting “the existing or foreseeable needs of the community for recreational and open space purposes, as determined by the public agency proposing to purchase the land.”

If the Naylor Act applies:
Before selling or leasing the land, the district’s governing board must first offer it for sale or lease to the city within which the land is situated. § 17489. If offered for sale to the city, the city must notify the district of its intention to purchase the land within 60 days. § 17489. If the city chooses not to acquire the property, the district must then offer it to park districts, if any exist, and then to the county. Id. The selling price must be not less than 25% of the fair market value and not less than the school’s cost of acquisition, as adjusted for increase in the area cost of living3 and any improvements made by the school. § 17491.
There was a good deal of debate at that time and really even now as to whether or not the Naylor Act even applied given the third provision. There is also a good degree of speculation as to whether or not the city council at that time would have invoked the Naylor Act. Many claim that the city was not interested in the land, although those on the other side mention that at least one councilmember was interested in the use of the Naylor Act. However, the fear was that the school district could lose the property and gain just 25 percent of its worth should the city council choose to invoke the Naylor Act.

As a result, the school district went to great efforts under the leadership of Superintendent Murphy and Tahir Ahad to avoid an open sale that would risk a potential invocation of the Naylor Act. These tactics raise serious ethical and perhaps legal concerns.

From the start, the district met in closed door sessions and in secret during discussions involving the sale of the Grande Property. Instead of noticing the public via the public notice section of the newspaper as is generally required for such sales of public land, the notice was buried in the classified section of the Davis Enterprise where few would be looking for such a public notice.

The arrangement that Superintendent David Murphy and Tahir Ahad had employed by October of 2005 was a land swap that involved a UC Davis property that was the home of Fairfield Elementary School. This piece of property that the university had not wanted was offered to Davis Joint Unified for at least three years prior to this land exchange. The university had been willing to simply give DJUSD the Fairfield School property at no cost.

Instead, the school district would enter into an agreement with BP Equities in which BP Equities would pay the school district $4.5 million in exchange for helping the school district to acquire the 10-acre site west of Davis. In essence, Davis Joint Unified would trade BP Equities the Grande Property in exchange for $4.5 million and the Fairfield School.

Coincidentally, this $4.5 million happened to be the same monetary amount that the district lost out on matching funds from the state when they missed the Montgomery Elementary school deadline. Questions have arisen as to whether the speed, urgency, and also secrecy of this deal had something to do with that lost funding.

The land exchange generated a large amount of controversy in the community. Under pressure for the seemingly sub-market value sale price, the offer was raised on November 22, 2005 to $5.5 million and the deal was locked in.

Nevertheless, controversy continued to rain down on this deal. First, even the revised sales figure seemed too low. According to the best information the Vanguard has uncovered, even given a semi-secretive, non-open process, there were at least three other offers that the district had at the time of the sale that were considerably higher. One of these was from a West Sacramento developer who eventually threatened to sue the district. Another was from John Whitcombe who had proposed a trade of 160 acres for Grande. A third proposal offered anywhere from $7.5 million to $10.5 million and offered to front the development costs.

The existence of these higher offers caused former Davis Mayor Maynard Skinner, who was in attendance at the November 22, 2005 meeting, to proclaim angrily that the district had just “kissed” away $2.5 million.

The problems with the Grande deal were not merely fiscal in nature. There were also severe procedural problems with the manner in which this deal came down. From all appearances the District simply did not follow the procedures that were outlined in the Education Code for the sale of surplus school property.

Education Code Section 17466 specifies that ordering the sale or lease of any property must be done in open session at a regular open meeting. However, this by all accounts did not occur.
“Before ordering the sale or lease of any property the governing board, in a regular open meeting, by a two-thirds vote of all its members, shall adopt a resolution, declaring its intention to sell or lease the property, as the case may be. The resolution shall describe the property proposed to be sold or leased in such manner as to identify it and shall specify the minimum price or rental and the terms upon which it will be sold or leased and the commission, or rate thereof, if any, which the board will pay to a licensed real estate broker out of the minimum price or rental. The resolution shall fix a time not less than three weeks thereafter for a public meeting of the governing board to be held at its regular place of meeting, at which sealed proposals to purchase or lease will be received and considered.”
Section 17232 requires that the process must be open and remain open for no less than 60 days. The provision includes for the transfer of property in addition to outright sale.
“A school district's offer to sell or transfer the land shall be made to all park districts, cities, and counties in which the school district is wholly or partially situated pursuant to this article and shall remain open for not less than 60 days. The sale or transfer shall be made to whichever public entity first accepts the offer, or whichever public entity can negotiate satisfactorily for the purchase or transfer of the surplus land.”
Furthermore, the education guidelines stipulate that “a request to waive the bidding process for a lease or sale of surplus real property” must assure a number of things including that “no other state code section or another agency’s jurisdiction will be nullified in order for the request to become effective.” Furthermore, “waiver requests generally indicate that districts have complied with the Education Code requirements but have been unsuccessful in selling or leasing the property…” Education Code Section 33050.

In fact, the district did not request any such waiver. It certainly did not go through the normal process and failed to get a viable offer. No effort was ever made to go through a public, open bid process as the stipulation for waiver would seemingly require.

Furthermore even if granted the waiver, the district still must go through an open public process at a “regular open meeting” and “the governing board will announce, at a public meeting, the applicants deemed to be qualified.”

Education Code Section 17387 specifies:
“It is the intent of the Legislature to have the community involved before decisions are made about school closure or the use of surplus space, thus avoiding community conflict and assuring building use that is compatible with the community's needs and desires.”
Furthermore per Education Code Section 17388:
“The governing board of any school district may, and the governing board of each school district, prior to the sale, lease, or rental of any excess real property, except rentals not exceeding 30 days, shall, appoint a district advisory committee to advise the governing board in the development of districtwide policies and procedures governing the use or disposition of school buildings or space in school buildings which is not needed for school purposes.”
One of the requirements per Education Code Section 17389 is the appointment of a “school district advisory committee made up of no less than seven members and no more than 11 members. The term that those who have followed this process the last few years might be familiar with is the 7/11 Committee—so-called for the membership requirement. But in 2005, this was body was not formed.

Basically the Davis School District did not follow Education Code in the original Grande Property agreement with BP Equities. It was a secretive, closed door process that appears, to this non-lawyer, to have violated each of these provisions of Ed Code.

With a new board in place in the fall of 2005 and Board Members Gina Daleiden, Sheila Allen, and Tim Taylor on the board, the concerns of many in the community led the school board to re-examine the issue on March 16, 2006.

Davis City Manager Bill Emlen effectively took the Naylor Act option off the table during this meeting. According to the minutes from the meeting, “Mr. Emlen noted the city’s interest right now is on the best project for that neighborhood.”

Bill Emlen told the board, “The Naylor Act although relevant probably isn’t a defining factor in this case.”

Maynard Skinner speaking as a member of the public said, “In my opinion, the previous school board was in violation of the Brown Act, if not de jure, then de facto…”

Brian Purcell, the President of BP Equities was asked by then School Board Member Jim Provenza if there had been an appraisal on the Grande Property done prior to the agreement. Mr. Purcell told the board that there was not.

Jim Provenza would move to withdraw from the agreement. Tim Taylor seconded that motion.

School Board Member Keltie Jones told the board that she had serious concerns about withdrawing from the agreement.
“I have serious ethical concerns about withdrawing from this agreement; I think it was entered into in good faith. I think it was entered into with the understanding that this was an agreement that we would follow through with.”
She argued that she did not believe that property values in Davis were increasing and that the district could end up with less money.

Jim Provenza then issued forth a lengthy statement on the Grande Agreement from the dais.
“I have an ethical concern about going forward because I feel that the process from the beginning was flawed. And it’s not because of anything that Mr. Purcell did, he was negotiating with Tahir Ahad in good faith, but our process I believe was flawed from the beginning. To begin with it was not actively marketed. An ad was placed in the paper the Friday before the weekend with proposals due on Wednesday. A lot of people didn’t even hear about it until it was too late. Another ad was placed in a trade journal. I spoke to several realtors and developers who felt they were not wanted in the process. That a particular result or particular developer was desired from the beginning of the process. Whether that’s true or not that’s the perception that’s out there. But we did not have the type of active marketing to find everybody out there that might have been interested in the property, and getting bids.

Those bids that we did receive we received one as high as $9 million. We were told, well don’t pursue that one because we were told you have to exclusively negotiate. But we ended up negotiating with a single developer for what was initially a $4.5 million offer. There was no appraisal done before we entered into this agreement until the very day that we voted the first time. That was the first appraisal that we received that was done that week, although I had requested one several times. The response and I’m sure it was in good faith, was it doesn’t make sense to do appraisals, they always come out too low or they always come out lower than the amount being offered. On the night that we voted for $4.5 million, we had an appraisal that said it was worth $6.3 million. Remarkably, we went ahead anyway, but with an escape clause.

We sought two other appraisals. But prior to those two other appraisals we had a letter from the city making Naylor Act claims which was forwarded to those appraisers. I believe that that letter affected those appraisers and I think it affected the amounts of the appraisals. I can’t say for sure that’s it, but it makes me really question the process.

What I heard from one of the appraisers was that he was feeling pressured to come up with a lower amount. That made me question the process. We proceeded with an agreement that had various escape clauses. BP equity has the right to walk out of this deal for no money today—that’s what was written into the agreement. This district has the right to withdraw from the agreement.

If I felt that this process was fair and open to everyone, I would feel comfortable going forward. One of the things I found when looking for an example at one of the Public Record Act requests about documents concerning this, is that there was confusion even as to information as to how the deal was going to work. I don’t think it’s anyone’s fault, I don’t think it was intentional, but I think the process was flawed. I think that the prior board wanted to conclude this agreement before the new board was seated. I think that we were, as a board, giving away this property at a fire sale price. I can’t prove that, but that’s my impression. And I feel as if I have a fiduciary duty on behalf of the taxpayers and on behalf of the students of this district, to make sure that we are getting the most for this property.”
Jim Provenza’s statement confirms a number of aspects of this process that we have mentioned. To begin with the property was not actively marketed. That raises questions about the sale price that was obtained. There was a reluctance to get an appraisal for the property. When Mr. Provenza requested an appraisal, a number of excuses were furnished in an attempt to avoid such as appraisal that would show the reality of the deal that the district was getting.

By far the most important implication is that one of the appraisers was “feeling pressured to come up with a lower amount.” While the appraiser would not go on the record about this incident, he did confirm the accuracy of Jim Provenza’s public statement. It appears that the district, and specifically Superintendent Murphy, apparently in trying to justify the low price for Grande, is alleged to have attempted to obtain a lower assessed price for the property. That is the opposite of what one would expect from a district that was badly in need of funds.

To this day, there remains no good answer as to why the Superintendent and CBO did this. One can only speculate on the rationale.

Current Board President Sheila Allen told the Vanguard during our interview was asked about reversing the decision to sell Grande:
“My recollection of why we reversed the decision—I think it was in my first meeting—is because I didn’t think it was the best deal for the taxpayers and the students of the district. I thought that we could do much better financially with an open process for the community. I had a problem with the process and with the amount of money and so I wanted us to have an opportunity to come in and start over. I truly believe—we’ll have to see what get for the sale price of it and subtract off because we have had some consultant work on it—but I can’t to see exactly what it is in the end that will have done a better service for the students.”
Current Board Vice President Gina Daleiden:
“In all of my conversations, before I was elected and after I was elected, in reports to the board, so my conversations with people who talked to me individually and also who did reports to the board who were professionals in land use/design/development field, the consensus was that Grande would be much more valuable sold as entitled property instead of as raw land which was what the first sale/ exchange was to be. Particularly if the school district as a public entity could find a way to work cooperatively with the city as a public entity to help us along with the entitling of that property we would really increase the value to the developer who would eventually buy the entitled land.”
Why was this agreement rushed through? Was it an effort to cover up for the loss of Montgomery? Was there another financial relationship between members of the district and BP Equities? That is not clear. Jim Provenza would not speak on the record beyond what he said at the public meeting in March of 2006. And those currently seated on the board were not in a position to know.

The district working with the city and developers is working on an entitlement process at present that is likely to bring in a far more lucrative sale from the property.

Current Board Vice President Gina Daleiden would explain the current process.
“The board has had a subcommittee of me and Tim Taylor, along with two members of the city council Don Saylor and Steve Souza. Katherine Hess from planning is staff for the city and Tom Lombrazo, who is a professional in land use and design is our staff person on this. We’ve been meeting including the neighbors in public—they are public to the extent that anybody is welcome to come, often the Grande neighbors are the only ones who choose to come. Usually reporters come in and out and I think just one other community came, maybe we’ve had two.

We can work cooperatively with the neighborhood association and have an open process. We have an MOU/MOA signed by the full board and the full city council… It basically says we’re going to work cooperatively together and try to maximize the value for the school district as well as fit the existing neighborhood and be a positive project for the town. We’re actually getting pretty close to being able to go back to the full board to get a decision on something to take to the city to their planning department… We’re going to put a tentative map on the property that shows how many lots and then we will sell those. The board will decide when to sell those and how.”
In their November 18, 2007 Op-Ed in the Davis Enterprise, Marty West and Joan Sallee argued:
“When we left the school board in December 2005, the finances of the school district were in good shape. Any financial mismanagement that has occurred has been on the 2006 and 2007 school board's watch. In early 2006, the board majority rescinded the $5.5 million contract we had signed to sell the Grande Avenue site, thus jeopardizing funding for building a student commons at the high school and modernizing Emerson Junior High School.”
In fact, what more likely would have happened is that $5.5 million would have simply vanished into the facilities problems that we discussed last week. However, instead of taking out a COP to pay for King High in 2006, the sale of the Grande would have covered it. It seems fairly clear that the Superintendent and CBO would then have been able to have avoided the discovery of the missing King High money the following year.

Summary and conclusions:

The Davis Enterprise on January 10, 2008 reported that a consensus, at least a conceptual agreement between the School District, the Neighborhood Association, and the City.
“The new school board formed a 7/11 Surplus Property Committee — so named because state law specifies the committee should have between seven and 11 members — that recommended the district sell the property. The money from the sale be used only for school facilities, not salaries.

The committee, along with city and school staff, and members of the Grande Neighborhood Association, reached consensus on a plan that features 39 lots, a workable traffic pattern, and greenbelts flanking the west and north edges of the site.”
Several things have changed with the school district, including unprecedented cooperation between the city of Davis and Davis Joint Unified to ensure that the process benefits both the city and the schools.

One of the common denominators during both King High and Grande under Tahir Ahad and David Murphy, was the lack of communication and the almost combative and adversarial relationship with the city.

It is important to note that the sale of Grande will not alleviate the current fiscal crisis in the school district. The money from any sale could only go to facilities and not to the general fund.

However it is pretty clear from the public record and a cursory examination of the law, that the original Grande Property sale made little fiscal sense and it certainly pushed up against the laws of public meetings and the Education Code.

---Doug Paul Davis reporting

Monday, March 03, 2008

Vanguard Investigation Part II: Facilities Finance and Construction Irregularities

This is the second story in our continuing series of examining the tenure of former DJUSD Deputy Superintendent Tahir Ahad and problems that arose out of his establishment of a private education consulting business in 1999—Total Schools Solutions. The first segment of this series which ran on Sunday, February 24, 2008 examined the inherent problems involved in a conflict of interest. The conflict of interest we examined involved a series of disturbing findings of how Mr. Ahad used his position as Chief Budget Officer (CBO) with the Davis Joint Unified School District as a means by which to start up his own private company for his own private gain. In short, he used public resources for private gain, a serious breach in the public trust.

If those specific problems were not serious enough, an extensive investigation by the Vanguard has found a series of questionable decisions and critical mistakes by Tahir Ahad and his staff, especially with regards to facilities planning. During the course of this second segment, we shall examine problems that arose with the construction of Montgomery Elementary School, Mace Ranch Elementary, which eventually became Korematsu, and King High.

Due to the length of this discussion, the next segment of this series will cover the Grande Property, and also examine the Fiscal Crisis and Management Assistant Team (FCMAT) report and how the implications of a budget deficit was created by the use of one-time monies to fund ongoing projects.

One key point that needs to be made at the onset is that the district brought in FCMAT. They also brought in a consultant, Terri Ryland who reconstructed the district’s books that were in disarray following Tahir Ahad’s 2006 exit from the district. The key point however, as Board President Sheila Allen emphasized, “there was no lost money, there was no money that was illegally spent, but it was very difficult for someone to come in and be able to track exactly—here’s the money coming in, here’s how it was spent.” The other key point that will be demonstrated much more thoroughly in a future segment of this story is that many of the problems that FCMAT found with the district’s books have been thoroughly examined by the school district and new CBO Bruce Colby and the district has fixed many if not all of these problems.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that no monies appear to be missing, what the Vanguard has uncovered amounts to serious fiscal mismanagement. Money may not have been lost, but these practices undoubtedly cost the district much in terms of inefficiency, time, energy, and the expense of repairing the damage caused by Mr. Ahad’s business practices. The FCMAT report rated the district a “high risk,” a score that will be explained during the course of this report.


Background

In 1998, the district attempted but failed to pass a facilities bond with the voters. Complaints ranged from the fact that the bond was too high to the fact that it covered too many schools and facilities. So in 2000, the school district placed a $26 million school facilities bond before the Davis voters. Included in this bond was $32 million in matching funds from the state. Measure K sought to alleviate overcrowding by building a new junior high school and two new elementary schools—one in South Davis and one in Mace Ranch.

The paired down ballot measure passed easily with 85 percent of the vote. However, in it contained the seeds that would cause almost a decade worth of problems for the Davis Joint Unified School District as well as many in the community.

The first problem was the decision to include Mace Ranch Elementary School in the bond measure. There were strong political reasons for its inclusion including a Mello Roos levied on the residents of Mace Ranch and the political need to include it in order to insure passage of the bond measure. But there were warning signs as well including a 1996 Future Facilities Task Force Report that suggested that future enrollment might only support an additional 1.5 schools rather than two full-two schools. Unfortunately, that projection has played out to present, where the Best Uses of Schools Task Force report basically found the same thing—the district does not have significant attendance to sustain a ninth elementary school. This is just a side note however; even now it is difficult to ascertain whether the decision to build two new schools was a clear mistake without 20-20 hindsight.

The larger problem however was the reliance of $32 million in state matching funds. The tenuous nature of such reliance was underscored just a little over a month after the passage of Measure K when the Davis Enterprise ran a December 19, 2000, article that questioned what a State Allocation Board decision to reserve a large amount of money in matching funds for Los Angeles might mean for Davis. This put into question whether Davis would receive their allotment of matching funds.

Ironically enough, Tahir Ahad was quoted in the article as saying:
"I believe it does not reflect positively on the work that districts like Davis have done to make sure we comply with the rules and regulations, and to get our applications in on time."
The problematic nature of depending so heavily on state funding becomes apparent as we examine the problems that underlie the construction of Montgomery Elementary and Mace Ranch Elementary, which would become Korematsu Elementary School.


Montgomery
Elementary School

In August of 2001, the Davis School district signed construction contracts to build Montgomery Elementary School. According to the plan, the approximate funding requested for this project was just over $9 million of which the State was requested to fund just over $4.5 million.

According to the state law, the district had 180 days from this date to submit a funding application. However, the district did not file until July of 2002, or 11 months after the contract was signed. This application was “rejected due to the District being non-responsive to Staff’s request for addition information. In addition, the District did not qualify for funding since the construction contracts were signed more than 180 days prior to the District’s submittal.”

A key point needs to be made clear at this time—it was not clear that the District knew that it had missed the deadline. However, the application submitted was missing required information and the district failed to respond to requests for additional information.

While the facilities plan in general fell under Tahir Ahad’s auspices, the specific employee in charge of the application was Henry Petrino, the Facilities Director who also worked on the side for Total School Solutions. The readers should be reminded that Henry Petrino left the school district to work full time for Total School Solutions but was hired back as a consultant by Tahir Ahad (as was discussed in the previous segment).

By January of 2003, the school construction was completed. The district then submitted funding application for a second time. The application was rejected once again since the contracts were signed more than 180 days prior to the District’s submittal. The deadline was missed not by a short period of time either; it was missed by a full five months.

The Davis School District was not alone in missing the deadline however.

As Marty West and Joan Sallee wrote in defense of the district administration at the time, in their November 2007 Op-Ed:
“Much has been made of the district's ultimate success in August 2007 in obtaining $4.5 million from the state for the 2001-02 construction costs of Marguerite Montgomery Elementary School. We are also delighted at this successful result of many years of work by many people. When we learned in 2003 that a new regulation jeopardized our application for state construction funds, we supported the superintendent in his immediate efforts to secure the funds. More than 70 other school districts had run afoul of the same obscure regulation.”
In point of fact there were problems with the regulations; however, that really does not excuse missing deadlines. A simple call could have clarified any deadlines for matching fund allocations. Many familiar with such processes told the Vanguard that it would be the first thing we find out, because almost all applications have deadlines. One would ordinarily build a calendar to ensure compliance with any and all regulations. This did not occur with the school district in the case of Montgomery.

The Vanguard asked Board President Sheila Allen about the chief problem involved in losing the state matching funds during the course of her interview in January.
“The chief problem for why we lost the state matching funds was because we missed the deadline. To me, that’s inexcusable to just miss it. For something as huge as this, I don’t know what else that you’re doing, but something so very important as this, you just don’t miss the deadline. That’s the reason that the whole thing started is that you missed the deadline. And there can be speculation as to why one would have missed the deadline, but the bottom line is that the deadline was missed. I don’t think there was a sufficient consequence for such a large mistake as that.”
The bottom line however following the denial of funds is that the district was short of $4.5 million that was being counted upon to fund Montgomery. Worse yet is the fact that the construction was already completed before matching funds were secured. So what did the school district do? Did they issue a mea culpa and ask for more funding? No, they did not. They began a process whereby funding for other projects got shifted to Montgomery. However, the lost money from Montgomery was magnified by subsequent problems with the funding from Mace Ranch Elementary School—soon to be called, Korematsu. Before we discuss Korematsu, we will discuss the recouping of the Montgomery money, which took place just last summer.


“Winning the Lottery”—Recouping the Montgomery Money

Following the second denial in April of 2003, the Governor placed a freeze on all regulations until May of 2004. Upon the lifting of the freeze, regulations for a 120-day grandfathering filing period were approved by the State Allocation Board (SAB) on an emergency basis. The district in November of 2004 submitted a 3rd application and this application was rejected since the District did not have eligibility for the project during the grandfathering period.

The problem was that by 2004, the district was experiencing declining enrollment and no longer eligible for matching funds by the state. It would take until the summer of 2007 until the district, with great effort on the part of staff and community, would secure this matching funding upon appeal.

Assemblywoman Lois Wolk told the SAB:
“It’s true that there have been numerous mistakes made on this application dating from the early year 2000 when the bond was passed and after that 2002 and onward… Many of these issues resulted in a new school board, a new school, a new chief budget officer, and a new superintendent. Heads have rolled indeed. But if the district is not granted this appeal, it is not those individuals frankly who were responsible for the errors who will pay but rather the Davis students.”
Former Assemblywoman and current County Supervisor Helen Thomson also apologized to the SAB for what she described as “very highhanded and arrogant” treatment by former employees of the district. She too emphasized personnel change in the form of a new superintendent and new business manager.

A thorough reading of the minutes from the SAB suggests that while the district did in fact recoup the $4.5 million in matching funds, it took tremendous effort and in many ways it was a decision made not on merits of the case as West and Sallee describe, but rather on mercy by the SAB. They certainly were well within their rights to follow the staff recommendation of rejecting the appeal.

Board Vice President Gina Daleiden told the Vanguard it was a combination of the efforts of Lois Wolk and Helen Thomson along with changes made by the school board that led to the reinstatement of the funding.
“We had a huge helping hand from our widely respected representatives, Assemblywoman Lois Wolk, Supervisor Helen Thomson, and Senator Mike Machado who all went in and made the statements that you can find reflected in the transcript. But basically it is my belief that the State Allocation Board, in that second meeting, understood that the district had made changes to correct past problems and mistakes, had acted responsibly, and had understood that our students would be the ones that would be most hurt by the denial. And our interim Superintendent listed several changes that had been made in the district that he helped make, and that our new CBO had made in our financial practices, so I believed sitting there in the audience, that the state allocation board understood that we corrected a lot of past mistakes and they were willing to give us the funding.”
The Davis School Board led by Jim Provenza worked very hard to make key changes that would enable the SAB to consider overturning the rejection on appeal. Senator Bob Margett, a Republican was a key player in the appeal process. He would not have been willing to overturn the decision had the district not worked hard to clean up their business office beginning with CBO Tahir Ahad, the replacement of David Murphy with Richard Whitmore as Superintendent, the hiring of Bruce Colby as the new CBO, and an implementation of the changes requested by FCMAT.

The Davis Enterprise quotes Keltie Jones praising Jim Provenza’s leadership and expertise on this matter.
School board trustee Keltie Jones credited Provenza, an attorney with the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office in Sacramento.

"We benefited from your expertise in the state Capitol," she said.
Board Member Sheila Allen generously praised the efforts of all involved.
“I have to take another opportunity, because I don’t know if they get a lot of positive press in your blog or not, but Mike Machado and especially Helen Thomson and Lois Wolk, not only came to the meeting and spoke for us, but they were doing political assisting behind the scenes and people were going out of the room and there were phone calls happening at the dais while people were doing their presentations. It passed with more votes than we actually needed. I felt like I won the lottery that day.”

Korematsu

As was the case with Montgomery, the district had budgeted roughly $9 million for the construction for Korematsu. Roughly $4.5 million of that was supposed to be financed by state matching funds. Instead, the district received only $2.476 million or roughly $2 million less than originally planned.

According to Board Vice President Gina Daleiden:
“When we filed for state funds enrollment was at one level and at the time the funding came in we had declined in enrollment so we actually received fewer dollars for Korematsu.”
Local funds had to make up the difference between the $2.4 million in state money obtained and the amount originally planned. Clearly, this is the fault of no one. However, it does illustrate once again the pitfalls of relying on state money as a necessary funding source. Due to the shortfalls and lost revenue, the district between these two projects was around $6.5 million in the hole as compared to the amount that was originally budgeted for the two elementary school projects.

Mismanagement however comes into play here as well. The project bid went to NTD Edge as a “sole source designed build” in which exactly one company was consulted.

The contract itself was very “unusual.” It was a “design-build lease-back contract.” The site would be actually leased to the contractor for $1 per year. According to the minutes from the September 18, 2003 board meeting:
“The design-build lease-back would allow the contractor to negotiate the price with the subcontractors of their choice, reducing cost and ensuring quality workmanship.”
The board would be informed that this arrangement would be “expected to see reduced architectural cost and reduced change order costs with this type of approach.”

This would turn out to be largely untrue.

Moreover, the minutes note, “Deputy Superintendent Ahad noted that the district qualified for funding for this project, but the funding is not released until a construction contract is awarded. There is a possibility the money would not be available, although the district already qualified.” Further Mr. Ahad “indicated that eventually the money would be released, but in the meantime the district would have a cash flow issue. The board member noted that was a concern.” A board member, believed to be Don Saylor, although not identified in the article, “noted that was a concern.” And in fact, the district received less than they expected from the state for this construction.

Further problems resulted from the structure of this contract. The board was told that they needed to adopt this contract the evening of September 18, 2003 or the contract opportunity would disappear.

In fact written into the contract were timelines and deadlines for the district to deal with issues such as the burrowing owl habitat within a timeframe that was largely infeasible. This led the contract to not be executed. As a result, the cost of materials went up and costs increased by at least $600,000 on the project.

Questions persist to this date about the nature of this contract and the reason for a single-bid award rather than an open bidding process.

King High

The fiscal practices of the district and the loss in revenues would catch up to the district and Tahir Ahad with the construction of King High. As we would learn in November of 2006, funding was just the tip of the iceberg. There was a fundamental lack of communication between the school district and the city of Davis. Davis City Manager Bill Emlen came before the board to report on several problems that developed.

The three largest were construction crews severing the root structure of trees on B Street that had been at the center of controversy. Suddenly a huge logistical problem conveniently resolved itself. Second, because the district did not consult with the city before proceeding, there was a discovery of a storm drain that ran underneath the King High structure. Finally, the footprint of King High intruded onto city property.

While Emlen was at this meeting, the board learned that the district needed an additional $5 million in COPs (Certificate of Participation) in order to be able to afford to complete the King High construction project. The revelation that the district only had enough money to complete half of the King High project put an immediate halt to the prior conversations and eventually a halt to the King High project itself until the district and school board could figure out what had happened with now nearly $10 million in facilities money.

In order to trace the timeline more accurately, we go back in time to August 18, 2005. It was this meeting prior to the election of Gina Daleiden, Tim Taylor, and Sheila Allen, that set the stage for what would happen.

At that point, Tahir Ahad was coming before the board for approval of a $10 million COP.

Tahir Ahad stated:
“These items are brought to you to implement the action plan which you briefly talked about on June 9 [2005] to raise money for the construction of King High School and to pay for some other projects in the master plan.”
Board Member Joan Sallee would then ask Mr. Ahad:
“And the reason we are doing this is to give us additional money because we have not enough left in the facilities bond. We’ve fulfilled our requirements, we’ve fulfilled our responsibilities to the community, but we want to go on and work on King High School and some other projects that deserve funding but were not included in that original facilities bond.”
Tahir Ahad responded:
“Yes, you are right Joan.”
Later in the discussion, Board Member Jim Provenza expresses his support for this plan:
“It would be a benefit to the students of the district to get started on those projects a little earlier.”
Keltie Jones follows by saying:
“Particularly for me, the key factor is that this is supporting the reconstruction of King High which I think is long overdue and that the students shouldn’t feel they’re second class and not included in all the upgrades that everyone else gets in the district.”
This sequence is vitally important because it establishes that Tahir Ahad as well as three board members at that meeting acknowledged and clearly understood that they were voting to authorize debt to be taken out to finance the construction of King High and other projects.

November 2, 2006, just over a year later Superintendent David Murphy, with Tahir Ahad now gone, was already talking about taking out another COP for $5 million to fund King High School.

Gina Daleiden forcefully spoke to this:
“We learned just a few minutes ago that more than fifty percent of the [King High] project is unpaid unless we make a decision about COPs. That is news to me.”
On the videotape of that meeting, you can hear both Jim Provenza and Sheila Allen stating their agreement with Gina about this.

David Murphy however tried to reassure the school board that all the money was in place; however, they just did not have the documentation. How he could make such an assertion prior to the audit was unclear.
“I’m sure we have all the money that we think we have, but the documentation provided to the FCMAT team was deficient… I’m confident that not only do we have the money that we believe we have, but the documentation will show that.”
The Superintendent then uses the fact that the top two DJUSD administrators in charge of business services were not there as a reason for not knowing what happened with $10 million.

Former Board Member B.J. Kline came before the board during public comment to make a strong statement.
“When we approved back in September or October last year I believe what it was when we did King High, we were told we were fully funded. We had the money in the facilities master plan, because we got the COPS, we had the money, I signed it, my name is on it. So I’m disturbed that we might not have half the money to build this school. And we made a commitment to that community to give them their school… This is one of the questions we asked during the discussion. Are we done with this? Can we move ahead with no problems? And we were assured that there would be no problems… The financing, there’s no excuse for that, absolutely, 100% no excuse… I’m a little bit, I’ll use the word, it’s pretty heavy, disgusted tonight.”
Board member Daleiden expressed her discomfort for going ahead with the project without secured funding:
“The deal is that ultimately this board is responsible for the finances of the school district… So all of this clean up work essentially eventually falls on our shoulders. I am feeling very uncomfortable and a little nervous… I’m worried about causing more problems for our system than we already have. The problems seem to be a little deep. As I sit here today, I don’t know and that’s part of the problem.”
In their November 2007 Op-Ed, Marty West and Joan Sallee blame the school board for creating this mess and suggest that stopping the construction of King High was costly to the district.
“The construction of a new King High School was on track. Funding had not been finalized, pending the completion of other facilities projects, but we knew sufficient funds would be available. The superintendent told the current board in August 2006 that additional borrowing would be needed, secured by future receipts from existing bonds measures.

In November 2006, the board majority, trying to create an impression of financial mismanagement, put King High construction on hold, causing unnecessary delays and costing an extra $175,000. In early 2007, the budget officer reassured the board that the construction money was, in fact, available. King High is now ready to open.”
The fact that this seemed to catch all five board members off-guard (and indeed even former board member B.J. Kline), the fact that no one could account for what happened with the $10 million surely suggests that the board majority (in fact, a unanimous board) did the right thing by stopping construction and figuring out what happened with the money.

The question quickly became: What happened with the money, and was it lost? The school board would take the lead to answer that question bringing in Terri Ryland, a consult, to examine the books. The board majority made up of four members heavily pursued the answers to what had happened with the King High money.

Their efforts led to an inquiry by Terri Ryland and FCMAT that got to the bottom of the story.

On December 7, 2006, Superintendent David Murphy gave what amounted to an apology to the school board.
“The project was approved by the board on August 17. However, on November 2, it was quite clear that the district’s procedures and the staff’s work by which we’ve kept the board updated and clearly involved in a timely way to understand changes by which to fund this project were very inadequate.

On November 2, it was clear that five board members were surprised to learn that the complete funding of the financing project had not already been approved by a board decision and would be dependent on a current or a future board decision. During the November 2 board meeting, staff indicated a second certificate of participation [COP] would be needed at that time to be issued in the future in order to complete the funding of this budget and that was not expected by this board.

Although that COP would be repaid by CFD revenues, the fact is the board was quite surprised by that need and believed the King High School had already had a formal board approved financing plan. I had not realized the board would be surprised, but the fact is all five board members were. We’d like to and should acknowledge where we see those things occurring, and then we should say what we should do as a consequence of looking at those facts clearly, publicly, and that’s what we’re doing. No one wants such surprises, I don’t want them, the board doesn’t want them, nobody wants them. They’re not done by deliberate intent but they sometimes occur.”
The district hired a consultant, Terri Ryland to figure out what had happened with the $10 million ahead of the FCMAT report that would be coming out later on and we will discuss at length in the next segment.

The answer of course you probably already suspect, the District under David Murphy and Tahir Ahad’s leadership took the money that was a shortfall for Montgomery and Korematsu and took it from the money that was supposed to go to King High.

As Gina Daleiden stated at the meeting:
“Essentially it’s telling us that the bulk of that COP money went to Korematsu… It looks like about $7 million dollars went to Korematsu… That would be a little bit of a new surprise for me. I mean I’m pretty surprised because that was not a discussion that I ever heard that the COP money was for Korematsu.”
So money that was supposed to go for King High instead went to pay for Korematsu. And money that was supposed to go to Korematsu went to pay for Montgomery. How could the board not know this?

Because the state matching money from Montgomery was actually reflected in the district’s flow sheets for several years even though the money had not been received—and so the board members were led to believe that the money was there.

Here was the key discussion during the December 7, 2006 board meeting when this was disclosed:
Ryland: “There was a time yes, when you did, and in fact, there was a receivable on your books as late as the 05-06 year anticipating the receipt of that money… So there was a time when it was part of the plan and it was anticipated that it would be spent on the projects at that time.”

Provenza: “At what point did it go off…”

Ryland: “It was reversed just this last fiscal year, at the end of the 05-06 year, negative five million dollar adjustment to state apportionment was made.”

Murphy: “In the district’s tracking documents that I looked at, that change occurred sometime before May of ’06.”

Gina: “So for two years it looked like the money was there when in reality we had not obtained it.”

Provenza: It wasn’t in our flow sheets but it was still being relied on… It was not in the flow sheets.” “We weren’t aware of the Montgomery money being relied on. But it was in fact being relied on.” “I think the problem is that the board was not properly informed that that money was still being relied on. That’s one of the reasons that we thought that the money was there for King… What I’m hearing is that the Montgomery money was being relied upon to pay for these projects, it was not in our cashflow reports, so that we did not know that.”

Ryland: “It was on the books as a receivable until the end of the year.”

Provenza: “But we don’t see the books as the board, we just see the cashflow report.”

Ryland: “Right, exactly. That’s one of the key points by FCMAT, and would be one of my key points as well is that if that reconciliation had been occurring, between the facilities department and the finance department regularly. ”
Gina Daleiden in her interview with the Vanguard sums up what happened as what was reported in Terri Ryland’s report.
“Basically here comes Montgomery, they’re short the money because they missed the filing deadlines, so now Montgomery is drawing more local funds than were anticipated. Here comes Korematsu, that’s budgeted for a certain amount, enrollment declines… Korematsu gets fewer dollars from the state, so now Korematsu is drawing on more of the local funds, and at some point this $10 million gets dumped into the same fund and now it’s all rolling together so it’s covering whatever was being pulled out before, also modernization projects are in that same funding… Basically King was the last project in, in that course, and the first one to run out of money.”
The problem is that the board was not apprised of what was going on. Part of this is that anticipated funds were included on line items as though they were actual funds. Compounding this problem was the fact that these funds were also not yet board approved.

Gina Daleiden in her interview with the Vanguard cited the FCMAT report (available on the district webpage on the right hand column) page 95:
“There was funding that was not yet board approved that was on a line that was called “redevelopment agency” funds, and that is actually in the FCMAT report, page 95, “since the issuance of FCMAT’s initial draft report, the district has disclosed that the $3 million was entered on the wrong line and instead should have reflected a new COP issuance,” which would have been financing, “with a second $3 million to be requested in 2007. Since neither amount had been approved by the board, it is not appropriate to reflect that as cash flow unless clearly noted as potential cash. The current practice of listing the amounts without such a notation must be discontinued. The district should insure that all revenue projections are realistic and based on likely funding.”
Why this money was placed under the label, “redevelopment agency funds” is not clear. The district staff under David Murphy claims this was an error. Regardless, it led the board to believe money was actually there when in fact it was only “anticipated.”


Summary and Conclusions

To summarize this segment, we can look at the problems with the district’s facilities planning as twofold. There was an initial mistake made in the filing for the Montgomery matching plan. Board member Sheila Allen calls this mistake in itself as “inexcusable.” And that is clearly accurate; you simply cannot miss out on substantial funds because of missed deadlines. That is why you hire professional staff and why you cannot have that staff preoccupied with other projects such as his work at Total School Solutions as Henry Petrino was involved with at the time.

The second problem, is instead of issuing forth a mea culpa, they took what appears to be steps to downplay and minimize their mistake. They shuffled monies around and then asked for additional funding under false premises. How many of these errors were errors rather than concerted efforts at cover up are unclear.

The district under Tahir Ahad and David Murphy assumed all along that they would get the money from Montgomery and that all would fall into place. However, based on what we know, this is incorrect. The SAB never would have granted the appeal and overturned the decision, had the district not made changes to their personnel. The board was mislead into thinking that they had money for project that they did not have. Tahir Ahad and David Murphy were not necessarily covering up the lost money—since the board knew that they had lost this money, but rather covered up the impact of the loss of the Montgomery money.

The board was shown line items that indicated that they had money that was not there. Money that they were told would go to pay for King High, instead went to cover for the lost Montgomery money.

The end result is that the district did not “lose” any money according to the best audit reports from both Terri Ryland and FCMAT. On the other hand, the district never performed a Forensic Audit of their accounts. The audits by FCMAT and Terri Ryland simply aimed at ascertaining where the money went and tracking it. A forensic audit would look to examine as to whether any malfeasance occurred.

Regardless of this point, as we shall discover in much greater detail when we examine the FCMAT report more thoroughly in the next installment, is that the district was at best sloppy with its money. That in and of itself, is a cause for concern. The amount of time spent dealing with these issues was prohibitive. Terri Ryland was hired at great expense to put books together for over 100 hours. The staff and consultant time in recouping the Montgomery money was considerable. The amount of money spent trying to fix King High design and construction problems and figure out the finances was considerable as well.

All of this results from a simple fact that deadlines for funding applications were missed and the need to somehow, some way, conceal the gravity of the situation from the board of education elected by the Davis voters.

---Doug Paul Davis reporting

Sunday, February 24, 2008

VANGUARD INVESTIGATION Uncovers Evidence of Wrongdoing and Corruption in DJUSD Business Office Under Tahir Ahad

Yolo County District Attorney's Office Looks into Allegations

Background:

On November 18, 2007 two former Davis Joint Unified School Board Members Joan Sallee and Marty West published on op-ed in the Davis Enterprise to purportedly respond “to the many accusations the 2006 and 2007 school board majority has made about financial mismanagement of the Davis Joint Unified School District.” For reasons not completely clear, they decided to air a large amount of “dirty laundry” in public.

The Joan Sallee/Marty West article purportedly responds to an earlier article from October 7, 2007 authored by then-current board members Jim Provenza and Tim Taylor. The Jim Provenza/ Tim Taylor article focused on the hiring of Bruce Colby as their Deputy Superintendent for Business Services, more transparency, realistic and understandable budgets, and prioritizing critical needs and requirements. It is not clear from reading that article of the perceived need by Ms. Sallee and Ms. West to respond.

They waited until the parcel tax was safely passed by the voters and then proceeded to open a can of worms. The Vanguard responded with an article on November 20, 2007. A quick perusal of the facts revealed that the op-ed by Marty West and Joan Sallee was fraught with misrepresentations and inaccuracies. During the course of the Vanguard’s evaluation it became clear that this was more of an effort to vindicate the reputations of former Superintendent David Murphy and former Chief Business Officer (CBO) Tahir Ahad. Adding fuel to the fire was the revelation that Marty West had become an employee of Tahir Ahad at his education consultancy business, known as, Total School Solutions, as a senior consultant in employment law. This and other new revelations spawned a follow-up article on November 21, 2007, “Op-Ed Opens a Can of Worms.”.

While many in the community have knowledge about what happened under Tahir Ahad regarding his business, Total School Solutions, and the fact he hired many DJUSD employees to work for him, some even while they also worked for him at DJUSD, the fact remains that there was never any sort of comprehensive reporting about just what occurred and whether any laws were broken.

These revelations that were uncovered on November 20 and November 21, 2007 led to a large number of members of the public to come forward with further information. The Vanguard was approached by numerous community members, employees of DJUSD, and spoke with dozens of individuals in the course of what has become a three month investigation. The Vanguard also sought out to speak with several key players including Board President Sheila Allen, Board Vice President Gina Daleiden, former school board members Keltie Jones and Jim Provenza, and former Superintendent David Murphy. Superintendent Murphy spoke with the Vanguard at length off the record. Board members Sheila Allen and Gina Daleiden spoke to the Vanguard on the record.

The findings that we shall report in a three-part series are staggering and troubling. In short, even members on the board and in the school district during these times were not fully aware of what went on and depths of the operations.

The first part of this series will look at the conflict of interest inherent in any situation where a public official is using his public position to further his private business interests. The second part will look at the ramifications of that arrangement for the district. Finally, the third part will examine efforts by the district. Successful efforts I will add, to make changes and ensure that the district is on much more sound footing in terms of its fiscal policy, even as it struggles with declining enrollment and state budget cuts.

Part I—Conflict of Interest

On June 17, 1999 the Davis Joint Unified School Board voted 4-1 to hire Tahir Ahad as the Deputy Superintendent for Business Services. Joan Sallee and Marty West were joined by John Munn and Ruth Asmundson in supporting the hiring of Mr. Ahad. Tahir Ahad was leaving a similar position with the Vallejo School District.

Those four members spoke of Tahir Ahad in glowing terms. The Davis Enterprise quotes Ruth Asmundson as saying “We raided Vallejo to get him. Vallejo is a bigger district… we need to provide compensation that is attractive.” Joan Sallee and Marty West both spoke in glowing terms of the hire of Tahir Ahad.

However, there was one member of the school board that voted against the hiring of Tahir Ahad and that was Don Saylor. What Don Saylor noted in his dissent were the seeds for what would happen under Tahir Ahad over the next seven years as CBO of Davis Joint Unified. None of what happened was an accident. Instead, it was all laid out in Tahir’s initial contract.

It was a highly unusual contract that contained several factors that would enable and permit Tahir Ahad to set up his own side business.

First, the standard contract called for 224 work days; however, Tahir Ahad was only required to work for 205 work days and he did so receiving substantially more money per day than his predecessor Tim Larin.

Board member Don Saylor pointed this out during the proceedings.

As reported by the Enterprise:
“I can’t support lessening the work year for a senior position… At the same time, the compensation package is being raised.”
The Enterprise continued:
“When Ahad’s package of $104,210 a year is calculated over 205 workdays instead of 224, his compensation will go from $440 per day to $508 per day.”
Or as Saylor pointed out the reduction in work days along with the size of the contract resulted in “an increase of 15 percent over the rate that was advertised.”

This would be the highest base daily rate in the district of any employee. This was arranged by Superintendent David Murphy. Concurrently, Murphy’s salary quickly increased greatly over the next few years.

This lessened workload would enable Tahir Ahad to spend more time building up his privately owned company. As one former employee told me, he would have all Mondays off from district work and part of Tuesdays as well, suggesting that the amount of time he actually worked for the district may have been considerably less than the reported 205.

Specifically written into Mr. Ahad’s contract was a provision that enabled him to seek outside professional activities. “This Agreement shall not be construed to preclude the Deputy Superintendent-Business Services from undertaking outside professional activities for compensation, including consulting, speaking, and writing…”

Again, this was not accidental and it marks a clear departure from the contract of his successor, Tim Larin. Mr. Larin’s contract required prior approval by the Superintendent and it expressly stated that other activities could not “conflict” with the performance of his duties under this agreement.

This was noted at the time by Board Member Saylor who said that he was troubled that Ahad was “intending to supply some of his time as a consultant” for other districts.

Mr. Ahad’s contract also allowed for him to have full authority to organize, reorganize, and arrange “any of the Business Office’s administrative, management, and supervisory staff.” This will become important as we discuss some of the management methods that Tahir Ahad exhibited as he often organized and hired those loyal to him while pushing away those who were more skeptical of his activities.

One final point that arose at the time was the existence of a pending sexual harassment suit from Vallejo where Tahir Ahad was working as their CBO. Two employees alleged wrongful termination by Ahad and one alleged that he had sexual relations with her and then offered her preferential treatment to keep quiet. This woman was in her mid 20s at the time.

Eventually Tahir Ahad would prevail by a 9-3 decision in a jury trial. However, it is somewhat surprising that some of the members of the board were not more concerned about this case at the time. Moreover, as we shall see, the case and verdict were not entirely insubstantial for the district, despite the ultimate verdict in favor of Mr. Ahad.

Tahir Ahad was hired by Davis Joint Unified School District to begin in July of 1999. According to his “Statement of Economic Interests” filed in early 2000, on October 3, 1999 (just over three months after being hired by DJUSD) he would form what was then known as Total Business Solutions (TSS), at his residence in Fairfield, CA. Mr. Ahad’s business was eventually renamed Total School Solutions.

For most of the next three years, few knew about this business arrangement; however, he did disclose its existence in his Form 700 Disclosures in 2000, 2001, and 2002. Word finally began to trickle through to the community and some on the board that this company was not only in existence, but that Tahir Ahad was working at a business on the side, and he was hiring district employees who were also working at both the district and for Total School Solutions (TSS).

As current Board Member Gina Daleiden told me in response to a more general question about conflicts of interest, one of the cores of conflict of interest policy is that “you should not use your public position for private gain.” While Ms. Daleien was not specifically speaking about Tahir Ahad, this is precisely what happened during his tenure as CBO of Davis Joint Unified. What we see during the course of Tahir Ahad’s tenure as CBO at Davis Joint Unified is that in effect he used the district to start up his business. In so doing, he began to blur the lines between his own private business and the school district which operates on public money.

It was school board election time in 2003. Keltie Jones had been appointed to fill a vacancy left by John Poulos’ exit. Now she was running for re-election. Running in the Davis Enterprise on September 28, 2003 was a disclosure that she had accepted money from Tahir Ahad, and the wife of Tahir Ahad as well as Total Business Solutions. There was a brief outcry over the prospect of a conflict in receiving money from a school administrator. Keltie Jones returned the donation from Tahir Ahad, but kept the other two donations. It was at this point, that Total Business Solutions had become identified publicly in Davis for the first time and people inside the educational community began to connect it to Tahir Ahad.

Total School Solutions grew slowly over time. By July of 2005, there were six directors listed on the Total School Solutions website. All of them were DJUSD employees. The Vice President was Susan Lendway who worked as a secretary to the associate superintendent for DJUSD. Director of Business Development, Aaron Shonk had risen from a secretary to the superintendent to the new Director of Business Development. Henry Petrino was a facilities director for the district and was Director of Operations for TSS. Vern Weber was actually not a direct DJUSD employee; instead he was a longtime consultant who did enrollment projects. And the general counsel of TSS was Maggie Harmon who worked as a budget officer for DJUSD.

By December of 2005, TSS added Nancy Walker who had been a business director at DJUSD and two long time consultants to the DJUSD Lonnie Poindexter and Ajay Mohindra. In April of 2006, Steve Horowitz had been added to the staff of TSS. And right now, there are well over 20 employees at TSS, over half previously worked at DJUSD in some capacity or another. Most recent additions include Solveig Monson, Tina Burkhart, Marty West, and Laurel Clumpner who still works for DJUSD as Principal for the Adult School.

Tahir Ahad would eventually hire four of his former employees from Vallejo Joint Unified to work at Davis Joint Unified. All four of them eventually ended up working for Total Schools Solutions: Tina Burkhardt, Rey Reyes, Nancy Walker and Susan Lendway.

Of those employees who worked for both DJUSD and TSS at the same time, this report specifically examines three of them: Susan Lendway, Aaron Shonk, and Henry Petrino.

Susan Lendway was Tahir Ahad’s secretary at the Vallejo School District. According to her bio on the TSS webpage, she has been Vice President of the company almost from the start in 1999. Ms. Lendway was hired to the position of Division Assistant, a clerical position in 2001.

Susan Lendway was hired as the confidential secretary for the educational services associate superintendent. Mr. Ahad hired Ms. Lendway over a number of longtime employees who had also applied for the job. More startling is the fact that the position was advertised as having a salary range of $2,497 to $3,187 per month. Ms. Lendway was hired at a rate that was almost $700 higher than the top end of that pay schedule at $3,874 per month.

More serious still are implications that come out of Tahir Ahad’s sexual harassment trial. Recall that Davis Joint Unified hired Mr. Ahad knowing that he faced litigation from two of his employees at the Vallejo School District. In November of 2002, Jurors voted by 9-3 in favor of Mr. Ahad. Key to that verdict was testimony by other Valley School District employees that Mr. Ahad was elsewhere on the dates that he was purported to have had some of the encounters. One of those who testified on his behalf was Susan Lendway. Lendway according to court documents delivered some of the key testimony that eventually got Mr. Ahad acquitted. Just before the trial Susan Lendway had been given a district job paying about $8000 per year more than the job was advertised for.

Regardless of these implications, the hiring of Susan Lendway demonstrates the pitfalls of a conflict of interest. Total Business Solutions does not report making a tremendous amount of money in those first three or four years—in the range of $10,000 to $100,000 according to Mr. Ahad’s 700 Disclosures. It would be difficult to hire and maintain a staff with the amount of expertise and skill as the one that Tahir Ahad was able to hire in the formative years of his business.

By hiring TSS employees to DJUSD as he did with Susan Lendway, he was able to provide them with a stable salary and more importantly use the district to provide them with health and retirement benefits. In essence, Tahir Ahad was in fact using DJUSD personnel with their district salaries and benefits as a foundation and start up for his company, a company that would eventually earn him a substantial income.

Aaron Shonk is another of the early members of TSS. When Tahir Ahad was hired, Aaron Shonk was working for the district as an executive secretary to the superintendent. He was hired in January of 1996, but in November of 2000 he became Resource Enhancement Manager. Then in November of 2003 he was named Interim Director of Maintenance and Operations and finally for his last year, Director of Maintenance and Operations. At the same time, he was working for TSS as their Director of Business Development.

This arrangement illustrates yet another pitfall of a conflict of interest. When employees are being hired to work for an individual at two different places, lines get blurred. First, as explained earlier Tahir Ahad had in his contract a unique signature authority to be able to hire and move employees as he saw fit. That gave him the power to promote those employees that were favored. Some of that promotion may not be based on work done for the school district, but rather work done for Tahir Ahad himself at TSS. That creates an inherent conflict of interest where you can no longer assume that employees are being rewarded for the job done on behalf of the school district. Moreover, the employees are no longer loyal to the school district itself, but rather to their boss, Tahir Ahad.

The case of Henry Petrino leads us to another problem. Mr. Petrino was another of the early employees at TSS. As Director of Facilities Planning, it was Henry Petrino who filed for the state’s matching grants on the Montgomery Schools Project. We will talk more about this issue in the next installment, but for now, we need to note that Henry Petrino submitted two defective applications for state matching funds. He was the one who missed the 180-day deadline not once, but twice. The first application was dismissed out of hand because it did not include required information; the second was dismissed due to missing the 180-day deadline—by five months. That missed deadline cost the district roughly $4.5 million in matching funds and set off a whole chain of events. It took an extraordinary effort and staff time last summer to recoup that lost money.

Was Mr. Petrino working on a project for Total Schools Solutions when he was supposed to be working on grant applications? We don’t know, but that lack of knowledge is part of the problem.

The other part of the problem was that during the course of Tahir Ahad’s tenure, many of his TSS employees would leave the district to work full-time for TSS. However, some of them were actually brought back as paid consultants for DJUSD.

One example is a contract signed by Henry Petrino on October 14, 2004. He had retired from the school district on October 1, 2004, and was brought back less than two weeks later as a consultant making $58.71 per hour. He was designated as a facilities consultant. The initiating administrator on that contract was Tahir Ahad who signed off on the contract. This in itself appears to be a clear conflict of interest but the looming question is unanswered—did any of this money go to TSS or was this merely a personal contract as it appears on paper. I do not know the answer to that either way, but it is just one of a number of looming questions that occur when lines such as these get blurred.

Vern Weber was never an actual employee of Davis Joint Unified; however, he was a hired consultant who did projected enrollments. He in fact did the original projections for enrollments for the Best Uses of Schools Task Force that would eventually recommend closing Valley Oak. But due to problems with those projections, he was replaced by Davis Demographics whose projections according to the Davis Enterprise were considerably less gloomy in terms of future enrollment.

Vern Weber demonstrates another pitfall with this arrangement. Tahir Ahad is given wide berth in terms of who he can hire. So Tahir Ahad employs Vern Weber as a TSS consultant at the same time Mr. Weber is consulting for Davis Joint Unified.

Total School Solutions was at the same time competing for qualifying bids in other school districts around the state. One example was the Acton Agua Dulce School District in August of 2005. Vern Weber’s resume is listed in their bid. The fact that he worked for Davis Joint Unified from 1998 until the present (at that point) was cited among a list of qualifying previous consulting jobs. At the same time you see in October 12, 2005, David Murphy, Tahir Ahad and Vern Weber attending the first Best Uses of Schools Task Force Meeting as district staff.

This provides another example of Tahir Ahad using the positions that he has hired his employees in the district as a means to improve the marketability of his own company. We also see around the same time, his promotion of his company over the district at a California Schools Boards Association Meeting.

On December 1, 2005, Tahir Ahad sat on a panel discussing Fiscal and Facilities Planning. “Hear a discussion of the impacts on fiscal planning and the type of facilities planning that must occur to meet the demands and effects of changing enrollment.” He is then listed as Tahir Ahad. His title is not CBO of Davis Joint Unified, but rather “President, Total School Solutions.” One can ask whether this trip was taken at taxpayer expense, but even if it was not, here he was at a CSBA meeting promoting not the school district, but his own company.

Meanwhile in an April 11, 2006 press release, the CSBA announced a new partnership with TSS.
“The California School Boards Association last month signed an agreement with Total School Solutions of Fairfield, CA to offer Proposition 39 performance audits to school districts.”
The release goes on to quote Tahir Ahad:
“Unlike our competitors, our firm is comprised of active and retired school facilities and financial management professionals who understand school management and the pressures and challenges faced by a district’s governance team.”
Once again, the marketing of Davis Joint Unified’s employees was used by Mr. Ahad to help produce a potentially very lucrative partnership with the California School Boards Association.
In November of 2005, Sheila Allen, Gina Daleiden, and Tim Taylor were elected to the school board. Soon after their election, Tahir Ahad realized that he no longer had his three votes to remain as CBO. Jim Provenza and B.J. Klein had often been on the short end of 3-2 votes in an effort to make changes to district practices. Marty West, Joan Sallee, and Keltie Jones were a reliable voting bloc in support of both Tahir Ahad and David Murphy. They had been joined by BJ Klein to extend Murphy’s contract as their terms expired prior to the new school board trustees being sworn in December 2005.

Realizing that he no longer had the majority of the school board support, Tahir Ahad announced he would leave at the end of his contract which expired in June of 2006. He had promised to continue working for the district up until that point, but apparently he had not kept that promise. In fact page 81 of the Fiscal Crisis and Management Assistant Team (FCMAT) report makes note of this.
“The Chief Business Official position became vacant in February 2006. An interim CBO was hired but was told not to work on facilities accounting and funding, because the former CBO [Tahir Ahad] would do that. That apparently did not occur, and thus the area of facilities needs immediate attention.”
One of the first tasks that the new board turned to was creating a new and stronger conflict of interest policy.

According to Board Member Gina Daleiden California Education Code already prohibits some of the practices that the Vanguard has found to have occurred under Tahir Ahad.
“My understanding of the government code is that employees should not employ other district employees in outside businesses.”
California Government Code Section 1126 (a) reads:
“The officer or employee shall not perform any work, service, or counsel for compensation outside of his or her local agency employment where any part of his or her efforts will be subject to approval by any other officer, employee, board, or commission of his or her employing body.”
Unfortunately weaknesses in the district’s previous conflict of interest policy prevented the district from taking action. “Our understanding from our attorney is that the district could not enforce that government code without our own district conflict policy. So we enacted the policy and then we were able to enforce government code.”

The existing conflict of interest policy prior to 2006 merely required “designated employees shall file statements of economic interests with the Davis Joint Unified School District.” These statements were the FPPC Form 700. As weak as that was only the board members and superintendent were assigned level 1 disclosure. Those associate superintendents, director of fiscal services and high school principal were only required level 2 disclosures while consultants were not required disclosure at all.

Board President Sheila Allen told the Vanguard, “There was nothing illegal about our conflict of interest policy. But it wasn’t as strong as it could be.”

So the three new board members along with Jim Provenza moved to strengthen it. Ms. Allen said, “In particular, we were interested in the question about outside work for our current employees and what our legal abilities were to know about and to restrict them to our ability.”

It was this point that drew division with fellow board member Keltie Jones. In the Davis Enterprise article from October 15, 2006, Jones was quoted as saying that this policy “put the superintendent in the untenable situation of not having clear direction as to whether the board does not want people brought forward who work for Total School Solutions.” Keltie Jones argued that this policy was really aimed at TSS. “If this means ‘Don’t hire anyone who works for Tahir’s company,’ I want that out there.”

Keltie Jones was the lone no vote on the consultant conflict of interest policy when the policy came up for a vote. She argued that it put consultants potentially at a disadvantage to have to disclose their clients publicly.

Gina Daleiden on the other hand was forceful on this issue during a board meeting in May of 2006 when she addressed the issue of employee conflict of interest policy, she told the public that the legal requirement was the minimum not the limit of conflict policy.
“I am interested in establishing a policy for this Board that defines and clearly restricts conflicts of interests and commitment and builds the public trust. Conflict of interest is an emerging area of the law. What is defined as “legal” now is the minimum, it is the floor, and I want us to reach higher, closer to the ceiling. I want the public to be comfortable with our practices and those of our employees. I do not want the public to question relationships, motives, connections, and decisions. I DO want the public to be able to trust the people who serve their schools. We will need this as we address difficult situations facing our district. I want us to be more transparent and go beyond the minimum, much as we tell the children in our classrooms.”
She would tell the Vanguard in an interview last month, “I think the rule that we should all follow as public servants whether we are elected as public servants or whether you serve in a public position, is that you should not use your public position for private gain.”

The new conflict of interest policy drafted by Jim Provenza and Tim Taylor specifically addresses the issue of outside employment. First, it acknowledges that “executive-level positions involve time and energy beyond a normal position of employment.” Furthermore it states that “outside paid activities are incompatible with District employment if they require time periods that interfere with the proper, efficient discharge of the executive-level employee’s duties, if they entail compensation from an outside source for activities that are part of the executive-level employee’s regular duties, or if they involve using for private gain the District’s name, prestige, time, facilities, equipment or supplies.”

It is clear from this language that the activities that occurred under Tahir Ahad will not be allowable under the new policies of conflict of interest. It is clear that the new board has significantly strengthened the language of the conflict of interest code to prevent a recurrence of the problem and to enable the district to take clear and decisive action should a situation occur in the future.

However, it is not without irony that the previous conflict of interest policy may have still have performed a significant function. Earlier in this article the Form 700 was mentioned as filed by Tahir Ahad. During the course of investigating this, the Vanguard made numerous public records requests. One of the documents that were requested was all of Tahir Ahad’s annually filed “Statement of Economic Interest” forms, the Form 700.

What was discovered was surprising. The first three forms were filled out with schedule A-2 checked, denoting “attached investments” and disclosing Total Business Solutions as a business entity or trust. The forms were filled out that way in 2000, 2001, and 2002.

However in 2003, 2004, and 2005 there was no such disclosure. Those years he checked “no reportable interests on any schedule.” However a quick Google search will show plenty of expanding business activity during that time. I have documents from each of those years showing Tahir Ahad as President of Total School Solutions. And yet he filled out no disclosure. In his final year of 2006, once again, he disclosed the existence of his business.

Upon discovering this, the Vanguard forwarded the documents to the new DJUSD Superintendent James Hammond and the district’s counsel Eve Fitchner. Since that point, the Vanguard was informed that those documents were forwarded to the Yolo County District Attorney’s Office and that there is an investigation underway. The Fair Political Practices Commission is also investigating the matter and will issue a report to the District Attorney’s office. It would be ironic if even the weak policy was strong enough to put Tahir Ahad in legal jeopardy.

This story was interesting in that each time it appeared that the investigation would end, more information came out, and further leads developed. There are a few areas that still need to be examined.

First, is that former employees complained about the treatment of classified employees at the time. Complaints ranged from employment practices, disciplinary practices, preferential treatment of those loyal to Tahir Ahad and the forcing of those not loyal to Tahir Ahad, to limited positions until they invariably left the district for other employment. Some of these complaints are quite serious but not confirmed.

Second, the Vanguard was told that the standard practice was that Tahir Ahad and the TSS employees would work until 5 pm. At which point they would shift gears and begin working on TSS business from district offices using district equipment. The Vanguard has made additional records requests to verify this, however, at this time; the district is still sorting through those records.

Board President Sheila Allen spoke with the Vanguard. While she was willing to come forth with information she did want to emphasize that it was a new day and that practices have changed.
“I’m totally fine with people knowing what happened that’s fine with me, but I want the headline and I want the last part of it to be here’s how it’s changed. It’s a new day. We have a new superintendent; we have an all-new budget office.”
It is clear that the most recent board made critical changes to their conflict of interest policy to avoid a repeat of what happened in the past. In addition they have hired new personnel.

---Doug Paul Davis reporting

This is the first in a three-part series. Next Sunday, we will have the second installment where we examine problems with the facilities funding that emerged as a result of the practices under Tahir Ahad and David Murphy.